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CONTRACTING WITH THE UNITED STATES IN ITS ROLE
AS REGULATOR: STRIKING A BARGAIN WITH AN EQUITABLE
SOVEREIGN OR A CAPRICIOUS SIREN?
United States v. Winstar Corporation
116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996)
Thomas J. Gilliam, Jr
"Punctilious fulfillment of contractual obligations is essehtial to
the maintenance of the credit ofpublic as well as private debtors."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Modem commerce is founded upon the reliability of contracts, and-in the
event of a breach-upon the availability of damages.' Normally, there is no need
for a party to a contract to speculate whether the opposite party will be in the
mood to honor the bargain when the time for performance arrives. The rightful
presumption is that there will either be a performance in accordance with the
terms of the contract, or a payment of damages for the breach. Such is not the
case, however, when one of the parties to the contract is the sovereign Federal
Government of the United States. When a business enters into a contract with
the Government, there is always a possibility the Government will exercise its
sovereign power to pass legislation which effectively cancels its contractual
obligation and leaves the business with no remedy.
The financial crisis suffered over the last decade by the heavily regulated sav-
ings and loan, or "thrift," industry provides a good example of just such an exer-
cise of legislative power. During the crisis, Government regulators sought to
avoid payment of claims for federally insured deposits by enticing healthy thrifts
to acquire failing institutions.' As an inducement for the risky acquisitions, regu-
lators offered to allow special accounting methods to help keep the acquiring
thrifts afloat after the mergers." Once the mergers were complete, however,
Congress outlawed the special accounting methods.' The result was "sovereign
avoidance" of agreements instantly driving more than 500 thrift institutions into
insolvency.' The flood of litigation which followed culminated with the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Winstar Corp.7
The plurality opinion in Winstar is a modem reexamination of the limits of
sovereign power to abrogate government contracts. The plurality held that pay-
1. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934). Justice Brandeis' simple maxim is a cornerstone upon
which modem commerce is founded.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 1 (1979) (defining "contract" as "a promise or a set of promis-
es for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty.").
3. United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2442 (1996).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2446.
6. Id. at 2446-47.
7. Id. at 2447.
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ment of damages for breach of contract, under certain circumstances, is not an
infringement on the sovereign power of the Government.8 As sovereign, the
Government may pass any law it chooses-but it must also honor the guarantee
of performance promised in its contracts. If performance is rendered illegal by a
legislative act aimed at that very performance, then damages must be paid.
Winstar examines such limitations to sovereign power, and it is certain to receive
attention in future disputes by any of the numerous contractors who do business
with the Government.
II. FACTS
A. The Savings and Loan Crisis
Winstar is a consolidation of suits brought by three separate savings and loan
institutions forced into insolvency by the congressional enactment of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA).' The impact of FIRREA was not limited to the three Winstar respon-
dents-it affected the entire thrift industry."0 Because the activities of the three
respondents were not atypical of many other thrifts before the passage of FIR-
REA," some general background information concerning the savings and loan
industry as a whole should be examined before any discussion of the individual
respondents.
The modern thrift industry began as a federally-conceived system whose pri-
mary purpose was to provide affordable funding for housing. 2 During the Great
Depression, the industry was subjected to extensive regulation after forty percent
of all home mortgages went into default and some 1700 thrifts failed. 3 Congress
passed three measures designed to stabilize the industry." First, it created the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board) in 1932 to prevent mortgage fore-
closures by making funds available to thrifts.'" Second, Congress authorized the
Bank Board in 1933 to charter and regulate thrifts.1 6 Finally, Congress created
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) in 1934 to insure
thrift deposits and regulate the industry under the Bank Board's authority. 7 The
thrift industry operated under this regulatory framework for more than fifty
years.
8. Id. at 2472.
9. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.
183 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
10. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2446-47.
11. Id. at 2442.
12. Id. at 2440.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-
1449 (1994)).
16. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
1461-1468 (1994)).
17. National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750g
(1994)).
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The United States economy went through drastic changes in the late 1970s, and
by the early 1980s, the savings and loan industry encountered a second crisis."8
High interest rates and inflation forced thrifts to pay higher rates on savings
accounts in order to attract and retain depositors. 9 At the same time, however,
the thrifts derived income from low-interest, long-term mortgage loans.20 In
essence, thrifts were forced to pay a "high price" for money used to cover opera-
tions, but they were locked into earning a "low price" on their loans.21 As a
result of this negative spread, 435 thrifts failed between 1981 and 1983.22
The first response to the increase in thrift failures was congressional deregula-
tion of the industry, including "a rapid expansion in the scope of permissible
thrift investment powers and a similar expansion in a thrift's ability to compete
for funds with other financial services providers."23 In other words, thrifts were
allowed to begin making non-residential real estate loans in an attempt to gener-
ate more income, even though they had no institutional experience in the area.2 '
Another area of deregulation involved the lowering of capital reserve require-
ments from five percent of assets to three percent by January of 1982." s Also in
1982, the Bank Board adopted new "regulatory accounting principles" (RAP)
which included the "use of various accounting gimmicks"2 in the place of more
conservative "generally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP) 7 By 1988, it
was apparent that deregulation, lower reserve requirements, and RAP were not
having a positive effect on the failing industry. The FSLIC's total reserves
declined from a surplus of $6.46 billion in 1980, to a deficit of $50 billion in
1988.28
B. The Bank Board ' Solution
1. Supervisory Mergers and Capitalization of Goodwill
In an effort to help the FSLIC avoid insurance liability for the numerous fail-
ing thrifts, the Bank Board began encouraging "supervisory mergers" in the early
1980s which involved the takeover of failing thrifts by healthy institutions.29
These mergers were actively promoted by the FSLIC which targeted potential
acquirers and made presentations encouraging the acquisitions." Naturally, the





23. Id. at 2440-41 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-54 (I), 101st Cong. 1st Sess. at 291, U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1989, pp. 86, 87).




28. Id. The total cost to the public of the savings and loan crisis was an estimated $140 billion through
1995. Id.
29. Id. at 2442.
30. Id.
19981
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mergers were not very attractive to the healthy thrifts because they often involved
the assumption of liabilities greatly in excess of the insolvent thrift's assets."
Realizing this, the Bank Board added a few sweeteners to the merger arrange-
ments. 2 "[T]he principal inducement for these supervisory mergers was an
understanding that the acquisitions would be subject to a particular accounting
treatment that would help the acquiring institutions meet their reserve capital
requirements imposed by federal regulations."3 The "particular accounting treat-
ment" promised to the acquiring thrifts by the Bank Board was the ability to cap-
italize goodwill, to apply the resulting intangible asset toward meeting reserve
requirements, and to amortize the balance over a period offorty years.4
In a normal business acquisition, GAAP permits an acquiring business entity
to "designate the excess of the purchase price over the fair value of all identifi-
able assets acquired as an intangible asset called 'goodwill'."" Ordinarily, good-
will is a way of recognizing that the total value of all the assets of a going con-
cern is often less than the price a purchasing firm would be willing to pay for it,
due to its existing customer base.3 1 In such a situation, it makes perfect sense to
label the difference "goodwill" and allow the purchaser to treat it as an intangible
asset.
37
The supervisory mergers promoted by the FSLIC differed from ordinary busi-
ness purchases because the healthy institutions "paid" for the acquisitions by
assuming total liabilities in excess of the failing thrifts' assets. 8 The difference
between purchase price and assets was not due to the customer base of a going
concern; rather, it was due to the insolvency of the target thrifts arising from
devaluation of their assets through loan adjustments required by rising interest
rates. 9 The goodwill recognized by the acquiring thrifts in these supervisory
mergers was generally known as "supervisory goodwill."4 The capitalization of
supervisory goodwill was expressly allowed in the mergers by regulators and was
a departure from the prior policies of the Bank Board.41 Furthermore, the Bank
Board allowed the acquiring thrifts to apply the intangible asset of supervisory
goodwill toward meeting their reserve requirements, thus allowing the thrifts




34. Id. at 2443.
35. Id. at 2442.
36. Id. at 2442-43. The Court quoted Justice Story's definition of goodwill as:
"[T]he advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of the
capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage
and encouragement, which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local
position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other acci-
dental circumstances, or necessities, or even from ancient partialities, or prejudices."
Id. (quoting J. Story, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 99 (1841)).
37. Id. at 2442.
38. Id. at 2444.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2443.
41. Id. at 2445.
42. Id. at 2443.
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treatment of supervisory goodwill was a strong incentive for the mergers. Below
the surface, there were less obvious effects from these accounting gimmicks
which provided even greater incentives. To fully appreciate the effect of the
Bank Board's gimmicks, it is necessary to understand the accounting treatment
of loan adjustments and their relationship to supervisory goodwill."3
2. The Accretion of Loan Discounts
The failing thrifts had loans outstanding at fixed rates which were below the
market rates prevailing at the time of their acquisition by the healthy institu-
tions.44 Due to this rate differential, the loans had a fair market value less than
their face value to be received upon repayment. 5 For example, if a thrift
attempted to "sell" an existing loan (an asset to that thrift) to another lender, it
would be forced to sell it at a discount for less than the full face amount. The
discount would be necessary because the buyer could make a new loan at the
higher prevailing market rates rather than buy an existing loan earning a lower
rate. By offering to sell for a price lower than the face amount, the seller could
entice the buyer to forgo the higher rates which could be found elsewhere. Since
the discount value would thus be the true fair market value of the seller's loan,
accounting principles would require that this adjusted discount value be shown
on the seller's books.
The loans of the failing thrifts were discounted on the books of the acquiring
institutions in a similar manner. 6 The loan adjustments appeared in "contra-
asset" accounts, so that loan balances would accurately reflect their true market
values. 7 As loans were repaid at full face value, however, the payments received
by the acquiring thrifts were in excess of the lower adjusted loan values, and the
result was a series of capital gains.' This recapture of the loan discounts due to
repayment at full face value is known as "accretion of discounts," and it contin-
ued until the discounts were exhausted over the average life of the loans (approx-
imately seven years). 9
3. The Timing Difference
The critical incentive for the acquiring thrifts was the timing difference
between the amortization of supervisory goodwill and the accretion of loan dis-
counts, especially since the two amounts were virtually equal in most cases." To
understand the impact of the timing difference between these two correlative
amounts, take an example of a failing thrift with loans discounted by $1,000,000
[see Table 1]. The acquiring institution would pay a price greater than the value
43. Id. at 2444.
44. Id. at 2440.





50. Id. (citing William K. Black, Ending Our Forebearers'Forbearances: FIRREA and Supervisory
Goodwill, 2 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 102, 104-05 (1990)).
1998]
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of the assets of the failing thrift and would capitalize the resulting $1,000,000 in
supervisory goodwill. The goodwill would be amortized over a period of forty
years, resulting in an annual expense (assuming straight-line amortization) of
$25,000. The same $1,000,000 shortfall in assets which gave rise to the supervi-
sory goodwill, however, would generally be due to loan discounts, which in turn
would be accreted over an average of only seven years as the loans were repaid at
face value. The result of the accretion of loan discounts would be annual capital
gains of $142,857.
Table 1:
A hypothetical example of the effect on financial statements arising from the timing difference between
amortization of $1,000,000 in supervisory goodwill and accretion of corresponding loan discounts
BALANCE SHEET INCOME STATEMENT
A B C D E F G H
Supervisory Loan Annual Annual
Goodwill Discounts Net Goodwill Discount Annual
Balance Balance Overstatement Amortization Accretion Effect on
Year (Asset) (Contra-Asset) of Assets Year Expense Gain Income
[B-+FI [C-'s+Gl [B+CI 140 yearsl [7 years] IF+G
0 1,000,000 (1,000,000) 0 0
1 975,000 (857,143) 117,857 1 (25,000) 142,857 117,857
2 950,000 (714,286) 235,714 2 (25,000) 142,857 117,857
3 925,000 (571,429) 353,571 3 (25,000) 142,857 117,857
4 900,000 (428,571) 471,429 4 (25,000) 142,857 117,857
5 875,000 (285,714) 589,286 5 (25,000) 142,857 117,857
6 850,000 (142,857) 707,143 6 (25,000) 142,857 117,857
7 825,000 0 825,000 7 (25,000) 142,857 117,857
8 800,000 0 800,000 8 (25,000) 0 (25,000)
9 775,000 0 775,000 9 (25,000) 0 (25,000)
10 750,000 0 750,000 10 (25,000) 0 (25,000)
11 725,000 0 725,000 11 (25,000) 0 (25,000)
12 700,000 0 700,000 12 (25,000) 0 (25,000)
40 0 0 0 40 (25,000) 0 (25,000)
Note: In years 1 through 7, income is overstated by $117,857 annually, while assets are overstated
every year through year 40, with a maximum overstatement of $825,000 occurring in year 7.
The timing difference created by these accounting maneuvers thus resulted in
two tremendous benefits for the acquiring thrifts." In the short term, the thrifts
showed a nonexistent annual gain for seven years due to the mismatching of dis-
count accretion gains with the corresponding goodwill amortization expense.
52
In the long term, after all loan discounts were accreted, the thrifts' assets were
greatly overstated on their balance sheets, and this overstatement of assets was
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gains with expenses distorted both income and assets, thus making the thrifts
look more profitable and better capitalized than they actually were."
4. Capital Credits
In addition to the special treatment of loan discounts, the FSLIC further
allowed thrifts to apply "capital credits" toward meeting their reserve require-
ments."5 The capital credits were cash contributions made by the FSLIC to help
the acquiring thrifts finance the mergers.5 They normally would have been
recorded as a reduction to the amount of supervisory goodwill created by the
transaction because they reduce the deficit between the failing thrift's assets and
liabilities.5 By applying the capital credits toward meeting reserve requirements
without reducing the corresponding supervisory goodwill, the acquiring thrifts
were double-counting the capital credits as both tangible and intangible assets.5,
5. Departure From Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
The Bank Board's allowance of the various "accounting techniques" involving
supervisory goodwill, loan discounts, and capital credits naturally had a tremen-
dous impact on the decision-making process of the healthy institutions as they
contemplated the mergers.5 9 Because such methods were not normally in com-
pliance with regulatory criteria, many acquiring thrifts prudently included the
allowance of the accounting techniques in their merger agreements."
The departure of these gimmicks from GAAP became unmistakable in 1983,
when "the Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] . . . promulgated
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 72 [SFAS 72], which applied
specifically to the acquisition of a savings and loan association."" SFAS 72
called for the amortization of goodwill for a period no longer than the period
over which loan discounts were accreted.62 It also required that capital credits be
deducted from the acquisition cost of a failing thrift, thus reducing goodwill
from the purchase and eliminating the double-counting of the credits.' With the
promulgation of SFAS 72, GAAP clearly barred the "accounting gimmicks"
allowed by the Bank Board and the FSLIC in the supervisory merger agree-
ments. 4 Following the Financial Accounting Standards Board's critical examina-
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C. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
By the late 1980s, it was obvious the regulatory measures undertaken by the
Bank Board to strengthen the savings and loan industry had, in fact, aggravated
the crisis." In response to the continuing decline of the thrift industry, Congress
enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA).66 FIRREA brought vast changes to the fifty year old regulatory
structure by:
(1) abolishing FSLIC and transferring its functions to other agencies; (2) creat-
ing a new thrift deposit insurance fund under the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC); (3) replacing the Bank Board with the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), a Treasury Department office with responsibility for the
regulation of all federally insured savings associations; and (4) establishing the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to liquidate or otherwise dispose of certain
closed thrifts and their assets.67
FIRREA also mandated that the OTS require thrifts to maintain a core capital
reserve of at least three percent of total assets." Further, "unidentifiable intangi-
ble assets" such as supervisory goodwill were excluded from core capital. 9
Supervisory goodwill could no longer be used to meet reserve requirements."
The OTS quickly issued regulations which eliminated the regulatory account-
ing treatment allowed by the former Bank Board when it promoted the supervi-
sory mergers.71 The OTS ordered all thrifts operating under the agreements
negotiated with the Bank Board to come into immediate compliance with the
new regulatory capital requirements.72 As a result, more than 500 thrifts immedi-
ately failed to meet reserve requirements and were subject to possible seizure by
regulators.73 A firestorm of litigation began from which Winstar would emerge
to reach the United States Supreme Court.
D. The Respondents
The three respondents in Winstar brought suit following implementation of the
tightened regulatory requirements by the OTS.74 Glendale Federal Bank, FSB,
Winstar Corporation, and The Statesman Group, Inc. each filed suit against the
Government in the Court of Federal Claims for breach of contract." Winstar and
Statesman had been seized and liquidated by federal regulators for failing to
65. Id.. at 2446.
66. Id. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103
Stat. 183 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
67. United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2446 (1996).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(2)(A) (1994).
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(9)(A) (1994).
70. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2446.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2446-47.
74. Id. at 2447.
75. Id.
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meet the new capital requirements, and Glendale had been forced to undergo a
private recapitalization in order to stay afloat.7" The Court of Federal Claims
granted summary judgment on contract liability in each case.77 The court held
that the Government had breached a contract to allow the application of supervi-
sory goodwill and capital credits toward meeting reserve requirements.78 The
Court of Federal Claims then consolidated the three cases and certified them for
interlocutory appeal.79
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
initially reversed the Court of Federal Claims,80 but the decision was vacated and
reheard en banc.81 Upon rebriefing, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of
Federal Claims.82 The Federal Circuit found that the "FSLIC had made express
contracts with respondents, including a promise that supervisory goodwill and
capital credits could be counted toward satisfaction of the regulatory capital
requirements."83 The Supreme Court granted certiorari not to consider the exis-
tence of any contracts, but to consider whether any special rules apply to the
Government as sovereign which would allow it to avoid the contract.84 Before
considering the existence of special rules for the sovereign, the individual
arrangements between the Government and each respondent should be consid-
ered more fully.
1. Glendale Federal Bank
The FSLIC approached Glendale in September 1981, with a proposal that
Glendale take over the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward
County.85 At the time of the proposal, First Federal had liabilities exceeding its
assets by over $734 million, while Glendale was well capitalized with a net worth
of $277 million.86 Glendale submitted a proposal to the Bank Board which
assumed that supervisory goodwill would be capitalized and amortized over
forty years.87 The Bank Board approved the merger by ratification of a
"Supervisory Action Agreement" (SAA) on November 19, 1981 .P'
76. Id.
77. Id. See Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 CI. Ct. 904 (1992) (granting summary judg-
ment on liability to Statesman and Glendale); Winstar Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 541 (1992) (finding
contract breached and entering summary judgment on liability); Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112
(1990) (finding an implied-in-fact contract but requesting further briefing on contract issues).
78. United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2447 (1996).
79. Id.
80. Id. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 E2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
81. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane).
82. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447.
83. Id. (citing Winstar, 64 E3d at 1540, 1542-43).
84. Id. at 2447-48, cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
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There was no mention of the purchase method of accounting or the treatment
of supervisory goodwill in the SAA, but it did contain an integration clause
which incorporated any contemporaneously issued resolutions or letters.89 Bank
Board Resolution No. 81-710 was the resolution by which the SAA was ratified,
and it referred to a written stipulation that any supervisory goodwill arising from
the transaction be amortized in accordance with Bank Board Memorandum R
3 lb, which in turn permitted the purchase method of accounting and the amorti-
zation of goodwill as an asset.9" Further, Resolution No. 81-710 also referred to
a letter from Glendale's independent accountant supporting the capitalization and
amortization of any supervisory goodwill.9'
The Court of Federal Claims, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and
the Supreme Court all held there was little argument that the intention of the par-
ties at the time of the agreement was to incorporate the purchase method of
accounting.92 In the plurality opinion, Justice Souter wrote:
Indeed, the assumption of Broward's liabilities would have rendered Glendale
immediately insolvent by approximately $460 million, but for Glendale's right
to count goodwill as regulatory capital .... [I]t would have been irrational in
this case for Glendale to stake its very existence upon continuation of current
policies without seeking to embody those policies in some sort of contractual
commitment.93
Thus, the question before the Court was not the existence of a contract, but
whether the Government had a valid defense for its breach.
2. Winstar Corporation
In 1983, the FSLIC faced a $12 million bailout of Windom Federal Savings
and Loan Association. 4 Winstar Corporation was formed by a group of private
investors who sought to acquire Windom." They submitted a merger proposal
whereby Winstar would contribute $2.8 million and the FSLIC would make a
$5.6 million capital contribution. Winstar's proposal was accepted, and the
Bank Board incorporated an acceptance letter into the agreement which stated
that "[flor purposes of reporting to the Board, the value of any intangible assets
resulting from accounting for the merger in accordance with the purchase
method may be amortized by [Winstar] over a period not to exceed 35 years by
the straight-line method."97 The agreement further provided that "generally
accepted accounting principles" would govern, unless GAAP conflicted with the
terms of the merger agreement.98 In the event of a conflict, the Bank Board's
89. Id. at 2448-49.
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agreement was to govern.99 Again, the'court of appeals held "it was the intention
of the parties to be bound by the accounting treatment for goodwill arising in the
merger."'100
3. The Statesman Group, Inc.
In 1987, Statesman approached the FSLIC with a proposal for the acquisition
of a subsidiary of First Federated Savings Bank. 1' The FSLIC refused to agree
to the merger unless Statesman acquired all of First Federated and three other
shaky thrifts.' 2 "[T]he agreement involved application of the purchase method of
accounting, a $21 million cash contribution from Statesman to be accompanied
by $60 million from FSLIC, and (unlike the Glendale and Winstar plans) treat-
ment of $26 million of FSLIC's contribution as a permanent capital credit to
Statesman's regulatory capital.""1 3 The agreement further provided for the amor-
tization of supervisory goodwill over twenty five years. 4 As with Glendale and
Winstar, the court of appeals held that a contract existed between the
Government and Statesman. '
E. The Government ' Defense
With the presence of contracts clearly established for the respondents in
Winstar, the Government asserted that it was not bound by the agreements. 0
Several defenses were offered, each working around the central theme that when
the Government takes action in its role as sovereign lawmaker, it cannot be fet-
tered by the threat of lawsuits from all parties affected by the legislation. 7 To
support its claim, the Government argued that four specific doctrines applied:
first, the Doctrine of Unmistakability requires that any surrender of the
Government's sovereign power be made in unmistakable terms; second, the
authority to surrender sovereign power must be expressly delegated to a subordi-
nate agency by the legislature; third, the Doctrine of Reserved Powers requires
that the government not surrender certain sovereign powers at all; and finally, the
Doctrine of Sovereign Acts allows the Government to exercise its power as law-
maker without giving rise to a claim for breach of contract.'
Of the four defenses raised by the Government, the Supreme Court wasted lit-
tle time in disposing of the assertions of "lack of express delegation" and "doc-




102. Id. at 2450-51.
103. Id. at 2451.
104. Id.
105. Id. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 E3d 1531, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane).
106. Id. at 2447.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2448.
109. Id. at 2461-62.
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in Congress expressly delegated power to the Bank Board and the FSLIC to enter
into contracts.11 Congress also expressly delegated to the FSLIC the authority to
guarantee any losses suffered by acquiring thrifts as a result of the supervisory
mergers.11 Further, Congress expressly provided the FSLIC with the power to
"authorize insured institutions to utilize subordinated debt and goodwill in meet-
ing reserve and other regulatory requirements." ' 2 Simply put, there was an
express delegation of authority.13
The Court held that the doctrine of reserved powers did not apply to Winstar."'
The doctrine states that the Government "may not contract away 'an essential
attribute of its sovereignty'... .,1 "5 The Respondents in Winstar made no claim
that the Government was barred from regulating them; rather, they sought dam-
ages for the effect of the Government's regulations." 6 The Court held that since
the Government was free to regulate the thrift industry, no sovereign power had
been contracted away and the doctrine of reserved powers did not apply. 7 The
Government's remaining defenses were not as easily dismissed, however, and the
Supreme Court focused considerable discussion on the application of the doc-
trines of Unmistakability and Sovereign Acts.
III. HISTORY
A common thread runs through each of the Government's avoidance defenses.
Each defense involves a conflict between the powers of a sovereign government
and the constraints placed upon it by the Federal Constitution.' What then, is
sovereign power? It is "[tihat power in a state to which none other is superior or
equal, and which includes all the specific powers necessary to accomplish the
legitimate ends and purposes of government."
11 9
In England, Parliament once held absolute sovereign power. 2 Blackstone stat-
ed in his Commentaries that each parliament held absolute authority such that it
could not be bound by the acts of any previous parliament-otherwise, no
absolute authority would exist if past ordinances could bind present actions. 2'
110. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1725(c) (1988) (repealed 1989)).
111. Id. at 2459, 2462 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f)(2) (1978) (repealed 1989)).
112. Id. at 2462-63 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1730(h)(d) (1988) (repealed 1989)).
113. Id. at 2463.
114. Id. at 2462.
115. Id. at 2461. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, N.C., 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914)
("[T]he power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety,
good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community ... can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and
is inalienable even by express grant."); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879) ("[T]he legislature can-
not bargain away the police power of a State."). See also West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507
(1848) (holding that state's contracts do not relinquish its eminent domain power). See generally Veix v. Sixth
Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940) (recognizing that thrift regulation is within the police power).
116. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2461-62.
117. Id. at 2462.
118. Id. at 2454.
119. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
120. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2453.
121. Id. (citing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 90 (1765), in which
Blackstone states "[a]cts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not ...
Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it
acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it's [sic] ordinances could
bind the present parliament.").
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No "higher law" could limit the supremacy of Parliament.122 American legisla-
tures, on the other hand, have always been limited by the higher law of the United
States Constitution. 12 3 State governmental power is specifically constrained by
the Contract Clause which provides, "[n]o State shall ...pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . "...'124 In Fletcher v. Peck,12 Chief
Justice Marshall interpreted the Contract Clause to mean that a state legislature
can repeal any law passed by a former legislature, but once an act is performed
which creates a vested right under an existing law, a future legislature cannot
undo it.12 Chief Justice Marshall said in his opinion, "[t]he past cannot be
recalled by the most absolute power."'127
Once the principle was established in the United States that one legislature
could contractually bind future legislatures, canons began to appear which
sought to weaken such restraints on legislative power.128 It was quickly recog-
nized that some check must be placed on the Contract Clause; otherwise, state
legislatures could become hobbled by poorly written or overly generous contract
provisions. 29 Several doctrines evolved from case law, each taking a different




As these doctrines of avoidance evolved, however, so did the concept of con-
tractual provisions binding the Federal Government. 31 Although the Contract
Clause applies only to the states, the Supreme Court has held that contracts
which create vested rights may also bind future Congresses. 32 With the prece-
dent established that past contracts may bind Congress, the doctrines of avoid-
ance were expanded to cover questions of federal sovereignty as well.1 33 Two of
those doctrines - Unmistakability and Sovereign Acts- formed the core of the
Government's defense in the present case.
IV THE DOCTRINE OF UNMISTAKABILITY
A. The Origin of Unmistakability
The doctrine of unmistakability evolved as a way to weaken restraints on leg-
islative power by avoiding implied contractual provisions.' When the
Government enters into a contract, it will not be deemed to have surrendered any
sovereign power "unless such surrender has been expressed in terms too plain to
be mistaken. 13 This premise is especially true regarding the sovereign power of
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2453-54.
124. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
125. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
126. [d. at 135.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2454 (1996).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2455.
132. Id. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
133. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2455.
134. Id. at 2453.
135. Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 446 (1861).
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taxation. The Government will not be presumed to have surrendered the power
to tax "unless its intention to do so has been declared in clear and unmistakable
words.' 36
1. The Early Unmistakability Cases
The doctrine of unmistakability evolved from a line of cases beginning with
Providence Bank v. Billings,137 which involved a state's power to tax a bank char-
tered by that state.'38 Providence Bank was granted the first bank charter in
Rhode Island by the state's legislature in 1791. 139 Although bank charters granted
after 1822 contained a provision reserving for the state the power to make subse-
quent regulatory changes, none was written into the Providence Bank charter of
1791.140 In 1822, the Rhode Island legislature passed an act imposing a tax of
"the sum of fifty cents on each and every thousand dollars of the capital stock
actually paid in."'141
Providence Bank refused to pay the tax, arguing that the charter was a contract
wherein the state had agreed to allow the formation of capital to engage in the
banking business. 4 2 By placing a tax on the very capital raised by the sharehold-
ers, the state was taking away something it had specifically agreed to allow.'43
The bank reasoned that the state's power to tax was restrained by issuance of the
charter because "a power which is in itself capable of being exerted to the total
destruction of the grant, is inconsistent with the grant; and is therefore impliedly
relinquished by the grantor, though the language of the instrument contains no
allusion to the subject.'"144
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the bank's argument, but
declined to follow it. 4' Instead, the Court upheld the sovereignty of a state's
power to tax. 4 In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
That the taxing power is of vital importance; that it is essential to the existence
of government; are truths which it cannot be necessary to reaffirm. They are
acknowledged and asserted by all. It would seem that the relinquishment of
such a power is never to be assumed. We will not say that a state may not relin-
quish it; that a consideration sufficiently valuable to induce a partial release of it
may not exist: but as the whole community is interested in retaining it undimin-
ished; that community has a right to insist that its abandonment ought not to be
presumed, in a case in which the deliberate purpose of the state to abandon it
does not appear.""
136. City of St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266, 275 (1908).
137. Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830). See also Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) (following the Providence Bank canon of construction disfavoring implied
governmental obligations in public contracts).
138. Providence Bank, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 559.
139. Id. at 519, 559.
140. Id. at 559-60.
141. Id. at 559.
142. Id. at 524.
143. Id. at 528-29.
144. Id. at 562.
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Thus, in 1830, Chief Justice Marshall's rationale against any implied waiver of
governmental taxing power laid the early foundation of the doctrine of unmistak-
ability.
Two decades later, Providence Bank would be cited in a series of cases which
revisited the issue of bank taxation. In Piqua Branch of the State Bank v.
Knoop1" (and two similar cases by Ohio banks challenging the same tax)," 9 the
United States Supreme Court upheld the doctrine disfavoring any implied waiver
of the Government's right to tax, although it ultimately ruled against the
Government.'
Piqua Branch involved a bank created under an 1845 Ohio act which provided
terms for the chartering of banks." The Act placed a six percent tax, to be paid
every six months, on the profits of all banks created under its authority." 2 The
Act further declared the six percent tax to be "in lieu of all taxes to which such
company ... would otherwise be subject.""1 3 When Ohio attempted to increase
bank taxes in 1851, the institutions created under the Act of 1845 refused to com-
ply because the new taxes violated their charter provisions.
15 4
The Supreme Court held that bank charters granted under the 1845 Act were
essentially contracts, and the "in lieu of" clause constituted an express waiver of
further taxation.' In the opinion of the Court, Justice McLean upheld the doc-
trine against any implied waiver of governmental taxing power which originated
in the Providence Bank decision. 6 He easily distinguished the express waiver
clause in Piqua Branch by emphasizing that the Providence Bank decision had
been "the unanimous opinion of the judges, but no one of them doubted that the
legislature had the power ... to exempt the bank from taxation, or by compact to
impose a specific tax upon it." '57 Piqua Branch thus served both to uphold the
doctrine of unmistakability and to bring the line into sharper focus.
By the end of the nineteenth century, application of the doctrine had grown to
cover a wider range of governmental activities. As passenger-carrying street rail-
ways became more numerous, for example, municipal governments began rou-
148. Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1853).
149. See Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1861) and Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 331 (1855) (essentially two more challenges of the same Ohio law, with both resulting in an affirmance
of the Piqua Branch decision).
150. Piqua Branch, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 415.
151. Id. at 376.
152. Id. at 378.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 392.
156. Id. at 387-88. There are several interesting comments worth noting in Piqua Branch which seem to go
beyond judicial courtesy. When discussing the decision in Providence Bank, rendered some 24 years earlier,
Justice McLean points out that "[t]his reference impresses me with the shortness and uncertainty of human life.
Of all the judges on this bench, when that decision was given, I am the only survivor." Id. at 387. Justice
McLean later seems to reminisce of his tenure with Chief Justice Marshall, when he prefaces a quote from
Marshall with "[i]n the language of that great man...... Id. at 388 (quoting Providence Bank v. Billings, 29
U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830)).
157. Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 387 (1853).
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tinely granting and taxing street railway franchises. The doctrine of unmistaka-
bility was frequently applied in cases involving challenges to municipal taxation
of such franchises.15 8 One suit typical of the "street railway" line of cases was
City of St. Louis v. United Railways Co."59
In City of St. Louis, the city granted railway companies the right to "construct,
operate, and maintain" street railways within the city."8 In return for the right to
operate for a specific period of time, the railway companies were required to pay
annual license fees of twenty five dollars per car."' The city later passed an
amendment to the original ordinance which imposed an additional license fee of
one mill per paying passenger. 2 The plaintiff filed suit claiming that once the
fixed price was paid for a franchise, the city had no right to impose the addition-
al tax. "
The United States Supreme Court held that prior case law clearly indicated it
was "not sufficient that a street railway company has agreed to pay for the privi-
lege of using the streets for a given term."'6 4 Such payment did not allow the
railway company to presume that the municipality could not exercise further
"statutory authority to impose license fees or taxes. This right still exists unless
there is a distinct agreement, clearly expressed, that the sums to be paid are in
lieu of all such exactions.""'6
City of St. Louis was an extremely harsh application of the doctrine of unmis-
takability, and perhaps even the high-water mark. It involved an increase of the
very tax that was part of the bargain, not a dispute over a different tax which the
parties had not envisioned. 66 The Court held that if the Government promised to
grant some commercial privilege in return for a fee in the amount of x, if the
Government did not also explicitly promise to refrain from increasing x, it was
free to do so at will. The Court wrote:
[B]ecause a street railway company has agreed to pay for the use of the streets
of the city for a given period, it does not thereby create an inviolable contract
which will prevent the exaction of a license tax under an acknowledged power
of the city, unless this right has been specifically surrendered in terms which
admit of no other reasonable interpretation.
67
Thus, by the turn of the century, the Supreme Court was interpreting the doc-
trine of ulimistakability very broadly in suits involving the Government's sover-
eign power of taxation. In order to prevail in challenging a tax, plaintiffs faced
the tremendous burden of showing the existence of an explicit secondary
158. See generally New Orleans City & Lake R.R. Co. v. New Orleans, 143 U.S. 192 (1892); Vicksburg,
Shreveport & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U.S. 665 (1886).
159. City of St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266 (1908).
160. Id. at 270.
161. Id. at 272.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 273.
164. Id. at 274.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 272.
167. Id. at 280.
[VOL. 18:247
CONTRACTING WITH THE US. IN ITS ROLE AS REGULATOR
promise by the Government not to alter the terms of its first promise. When the
agreement did not involve the power to tax, however, the Court was usually
inclined to give the plaintiffs much more of the benefit of their bargain.
2. Ordinary Government Contract Cases
During the 1930s, the Supreme Court began a period of redefining the
Government's role in ordinary contract cases. One example of a non-taxation
case involving Government contracts is Lynch v. United States.1 68 During the
first World War, the Government sold War Risk Insurance to members of the mil-
itary.169 The policies were for term insurance, renewable yearly, which covered
death or disability during the war.17 Although the insured parties paid for the
policies, they were heavily subsidized by the Government.17 1 The Government
admitted that "[w]ar risk insurance was devised in the hope that it would, in large
measure, avoid the necessity of granting pensions." '72 Further, the enacting legis-
lation of 1917 allowed conversion of these policies into ordinary life insurance
within five years after the end of the war.17 Then, in 1933, Congress repealed
"[a]ll laws granting or pertaining to yearly renewable term insurance." 174
The plaintiffs - insured parties under the Act - filed suit claiming that they
had been deprived of property without due process of law in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.17 In an opinion written by Justice Brandeis, the Supreme
Court held that:
Valid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a
municipality, a State, or the United States. Rights against the United States aris-
ing out of a contract with it are protected by the Fifth Amendment. When the
United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are gov-
erned generally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals.'76
The Court thus held for the plaintiffs. More importantly, Justice Brandeis fur-
ther defined the constraints placed on the Government when it assumes contrac-
tual obligations.'77  It is interesting to note the stark contrast between the
Government's ability to avoid a contract when the power of taxation is involved,
168. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
169. Id. at 574.
170. Id. at 576.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 574. The legislation provided that
"during the period of war and thereafter until converted the insurance shall be term insurance for
successive terms of one year each. Not later than five years after the date of the termination of the
war as declared by proclamation of the President of the United States, the term insurance shall be
converted, without medical examination, into such form or forms of insurance as may be prescribed
by regulations and as the insured may request. Regulations shall provide for the right to convert into
ordinary life, twenty payment life, endowment maturing at age sixty-two and into other usual forms
of insurance."
Id. (quoting War Risk Insurance Act of October 6, 1917, c. 105, Article IV, §§ 400-05).
174. Id. at 575.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 579 (citing United States v. Central Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 235, 238 (1886); United States v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 256 U.S. 51, 64, 67 (1921)).
177. Id. at580.
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and its role as an ordinary contractor when legislation creating vested rights in
individuals is concerned. Justice Brandeis wrote:
Congress was without power to reduce expenditures by abrogating contractual
obligations of the United States. To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen
government expenditure, would be not the practice of economy, but an act of
repudiation. "The United States are as much bound by their contracts as are
individuals. If they repudiate their obligations, it is as much repudiation, with
all the wrong and reproach that term implies, as it would be if the repudiator had
been a State or a municipality or a citizen."
178
Lynch thus served to define the role of the government as an ordinary contrac-
tor and removed any doubt that the Contract Clause applied to the United States
when vested rights were concerned. The doctrine of unmistakability had no
application when a sovereign power was not at stake. In fact, the doctrine had
fallen into a period of quiescence after the turn of the century, and it was rarely,
if ever, invoked until it was revived in a series of three cases in the 1980s.
179
These cases marked a subtle shift in the doctrine of unmistakability, and one
even provided an example of the doctrine's application in an area other than taxa-
tion.
3. The Reemergence of Unmistakability
The first of the 1980s cases, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,18 1 involved the
sovereign power to tax, although the sovereign in question was an Apache Indian
Tribe. Beginning in 1953, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe began leasing mineral
rights to oil companies. 81 Then, in 1976, the Tribal Council imposed a severance
tax on "any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands." '82
The primary issue before the Court was whether the Tribe possessed any power
to tax, and the Court answered that question in the Tribe's favor.'83 The oil com-
panies further asserted, however, that when the Tribe executed the mineral leases,
there was an implied agreement that it would not exercise its sovereign authority
to tax the leaseholds.1
84
In reaching its decision, the Court resorted to the familiar line of reasoning
found in the earlier unmistakability cases. 8s In writing the opinion of the Court,
Justice Marshall explained: "The fact that the tribe chooses not to exercise its
178. Id. (quoting Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1879)).
179. See United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc.
Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
180. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
181. Id. at 135.
182. Id. at 135-136.
183. Id. at 141. The Court did, however, find that the Tribe's authority to tax was subject to constraint by the
Government. Id. For instance, Congress can remove the Tribe's power to tax, and the Tribe's constitution and
bylaws are subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior. As these constraints posed no obstacle in the
present case, however, the Court held that the Tribe's power to tax was the same sovereign power possessed by
any other governmental entity. Id.
184. Id. at 145.
185. Id. at 147-48.
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power to tax when it initially grants a non-Indian entry onto the reservation does
not permanently divest the tribe of its authority to impose such a tax." '86 Further
supporting the Tribe's sovereignty, Justice Marshall wrote:
It is one thing to find that the Tribe has agreed to sell the right to use the land
and take from it valuable minerals; it is quite another to find that the Tribe has
abandoned its sovereign powers simply because it has not expressly reserved
them through a contract."8 7
Justice Marshall then made it absolutely clear that the Court's decision in favor
of the Tribe's severance tax was firmly rooted it the doctrine of unmistakability:
"[S]overeign power, even when unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs
all contracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless
surrendered in unmistakable terms." '188 The doctrine of unmistakability had
emerged from its slumber.
Four years after Merrion, the Supreme Court again invoked the unmistakability
doctrine in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment.8
Bowen involved a dispute between certain state agencies and the Federal
Government over the right to withdraw from the Social Security System.1 9
When the Social Security Act of 193591 was originally passed, it excluded
employees of states and their political subdivisions from coverage.8 2 Congress
also "expressly reserved to itself '[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provi-
sion of' the Act."8 3 Then, in 1950, Congress enacted section 418 of the Social
Security Act which allowed states to voluntarily participate in the Social Security
System by enrolling all or any portion of their employees. '94 To participate, the
states were required to execute agreements for designated "coverage groups""19
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 9 Section 418 also allowed
states to terminate their coverage by giving written notice to the Secretary, but
notice was required two years in advance of withdrawing from the System.197
At first, the number of coverage groups joining the System far exceeded the
number of groups-withdrawing. 98 Then, in 1976, the trend reversed and the
number of coverage groups withdrawing from the System began to greatly
exceed the number joining.199 Between 1977 and 1982, coverage was terminated
for 190,000 positions, and notice had been given for the termination of an addi-
tional 227,000 positions, pending the required two year notice period.200
186. Id. at 145.
187. Id. at 146.
188. Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
189. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
190. Id. at 49.
191. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
192. Bowen, 477 U.S. at 44 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(7) (1982)).
193. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982)).
194. Id. at 45 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 418(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1982)).
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 418(b)(5) (1994) (defining "coverage group").
196. Bowen, 477 U.S. at 45.
197. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 418(g)(1) (Supp. 111982)).
198. Id. at 46.
199. Id.
200. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-25, at 17 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 219, 235).
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Congress determined the Social Security System was threatened by the with-
drawals, and it passed an amendment in 1983 that repealed the section 418 provi-
sion allowing termination of coverage for states and their political subdivi-
sions."'
Several California Agencies had termination notices pending when the section
418 provision was repealed, and "the amendment prevented the termination
notices from taking effect."2 2 The Agencies filed suit claiming that they had
been deprived of contract rights "without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment."" 3 They did not dispute the fact that Congress had reserved
the right to amend the Social Security Act.20 4 Rather, the Agencies argued they
had exercised a vested contractual right when they gave notice to withdraw, and
the amendment therefore did not apply to them.20 ' In other words, the Agencies
argued Congress was free to repeal the section 418 provision that allowed with-
drawal from the System, but it was not free to breach an agreement made under
section 418 because the agreement created vested rights.0 6
The Supreme Court rejected the Agencies' reasoning, and in doing so, it relied
on the doctrine of unmistakability as revived in Merrion:
While the Federal Government, as sovereign, has the power to enter contracts
that confer vested rights, and the concomitant duty to honor those rights,07 we
have declined in the context of commercial contracts to find that a "sovereign
forever waives the right to exercise one of its sovereign powers unless it express-
ly reserves the right to exercise that power in" the contract.0 '
In delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, Justice Powell reasoned that
Congress had expressly reserved the right to amend section 418 under which the
enrollment agreements were executed, and further, that the agreements them-
selves specified that they conformed with section 418, thus expressly incorporat-
ing the reserved power of amendment into the bargains."' The decision of the
Court thus seems to rest upon an express reservation of power by Congress. Had
the Government action in question been the exercise of a sovereign power, how-
ever, the doctrine of unmistakability would have made an express reservation of
power totally unnecessary, and the Government would have automatically pre-
vailed.
Something less than sovereign power was at stake in Bowen, and Justice Powell
continued his analysis with an examination of vested rights under an ordinary
201. Id. at 48.
202. Id. at 49.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 50.
205. Id. at 50-51.
206. Id. at 51.
207. Id. at 52 (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-
54(1935)).
208. Id. (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982)).
209. Id. at 54.
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contract where governmental regulatory action is involved."' He wrote of the
termination clause of the section 418 enrollment agreements:
The provision constituted neither a debt of the United States, nor an obligation of
the United States to provide benefits under a contract for which the obligee paid
a monetary premium. The termination clause was not . . . a term over which the
State had any bargaining power or for which the State provided independent con-
sideration. Rather, the provision simply was part of a regulatory program over
which Congress retained authority to amend in the exercise of its power to pro-
vide for the general welfare. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
termination provision... did not rise to the level of "property." The provision
simply cannot be viewed as conferring any sort of "vested right"....211
The Court's decision in Bowen thus hinged on a ruling that the clause allowing
the Agencies to withdraw from the Social Security System did not rise to the
level of an ordinary contract.212 Therefore, in the absence of both an exercise of
sovereign power by the Government and a vested right conferred on the
Agencies, the Government prevailed.
Justice Powell's probing analysis in Bowen was important because it shed new
light on the doctrine of unmistakability. Justice Powell's analysis demonstrated
that the powerful nineteenth century doctrine found in City of St. Louis2M3 was
clearly influenced by the Fifth Amendment requirements of the 1930s contract
cases such as Lynch.211 Justice Powell's view of the doctrine of unmistakability
seemed to suggest that if no important sovereign power was at stake, then there
should be an examination of the nature of the contract involved. Indeed, Justice
Powell weighed the characteristics of ordinary contracts (such as the existence of
a debt, a paid obligation to provide benefits, a bargained-for agreement, or inde-
pendent consideration) against the needs of a regulatory program providing for
the general welfare.215 Furthermore, he acknowledged that if vested rights had
been found, the Fifth Amendment would have prevented the taking of those con-
tractual rights without just compensation.1 6 Justice Powell's opinion thus
explored the dim boundaries of unmistakability by highlighting the differences
between the Government's power when acting as a sovereign and its power when
acting as an ordinary contractor.217
Before the end of the decade, the Supreme Court would again consider the
doctrine of unmistakability in United States v. Cherokee Nation.215 Cherokee
Nation involved a suit by an Indian Tribe against the Federal Government for
damage to a riverbed caused by navigational improvements.21s The Government
had undertaken a channel improvement project on the Arkansas River which
210. Id. at 55.
211. Id. (citations omitted).
212. Id.
213. City of St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266 (1908).
214. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
215. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 (1986).
216. Id. at 55-56.
217. Id.
218. United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
219. Id. at 701.
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caused damage to sand and gravel deposits along a portion of the river owned by
the Cherokee Nation. 220 The Tribe contended that the project caused a taking of
their riverbed interests without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 221 The Government maintained that "its navigational servitude pre-
cluded liability for the alleged taking. 222
The district court granted summary judgment for the Tribe and held the section
of river in question was "essentially, a private waterway belonging exclusively to
the Cherokee Nation."223 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court, but it did so for an entirely different reason.24 The court of appeals
recognized a sovereign nature to the navigational servitude, so it balanced the
public's interest in navigation with private ownership rights and held that
although "the Cherokee Nation could not interfere with the United States' exer-
cise of the navigational servitude, it had a right to compensation for any conse-
quent loss of property or diminution in value.1
25
The Supreme Court flatly rejected any award of compensation to the tribe and
based its holding on the presence of a sovereign power to maintain navigable
waterways:
We think the Court of Appeals erred in formulating a balancing test to evaluate
this assertion of the navigational servitude. No such "balancing" is required
where, as here, the interference with in-stream interests results from an exercise
of the Government's power to regulate navigational uses of "the deep streams
which penetrate our country in every direction. '26 Though "this Court has
never held that the navigational servitude creates a blanket exception to the
Takings Clause whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause authority to
promote navigation," '227 there can be no doubt that "[t]he Commerce Clause con-
fers a unique position upon the Government in connection with navigable
waters." '228 It gives to the Federal Government "a 'dominant servitude,' 229 which
extends to the entire stream and the stream bed below ordinary highwater mark.
The proper exercise of this power is not an invasion of any private property
rights in the stream or the lands underlying it, for the damage sustained does not
result from taking property from riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment but from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of
riparian owners have always been subject.
230
220. Id.
221. Id. at 702.
222. Id. A Navigation Servitude is the "[p]ublic right of navigation for the use of the people at large."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (6th ed. 1990).
223. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 2ba).
224. Id. at 703. See also Cherokee Nation v. United States, 782 F2d 871 (1986).
225. Id. See also Cherokee Nation v. United States, 782 F.2d 871 (1986).
226. Id. at 703-04 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824)).
227. Id. at 704 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979)).
228. Id. (quoting United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122 (1967)).
229. Id. (quoting FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954)).
230. Id. (quoting United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967); see also United States v. Kansas City Life
Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900)).
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Thus, the sovereignty of the Government's action was established, and
the Supreme Court proceeded to ground its decision in the doctrine of unmistak-
ability.231 The Court held the Cherokee Nation could prevail only if the
Government had surrendered its sovereign authority over the navigational servi-
tude in unmistakable terms.232 The Supreme Court held the Government had not
done so, and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.233 The Government's
exercise of sovereign power prevailed over the vested rights of the Tribe.
Cherokee Nation was the last application of the doctrine of unmistakability
before Winstar, and it is interesting to note that neither case involved the power
of taxation. Cherokee Nation allowed the Court to apply unmistakability in a
non-taxation forum related to the public interest in navigation. Winstar would
give the Court an opportunity to examine unmistakability where the regulation of
financial institutions was concerned. If the Supreme Court was seeking to affect
a twentieth century expansion of the doctrine of unmistakability, Winstar would
provide the perfect forum for the occasion.
B. The Application of Unmistakability in The Present Case
The Winstar decision is the product of a divided Court. The plurality opinion
was written by Justice Souter, with whom Justices Stevens, Breyer, and
O'Connor joined.234 Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion concurring in the
judgment only, which was joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas.23 Chief
Justice Rehnquist dissented and was joined by Justice Ginsburg.236
In writing the plurality opinion, Justice Souter began his analysis of the
Government's unmistakability defense with an examination of the trio of 1980s
cases-Merrion, Bowen, and Cherokee Nation.237 He found their collective hold-
ing to be:
[A] contract with a sovereign government will not be read to include an unstated
term exempting the other contracting party from the application of a subsequent
sovereign act (including an act of Congress), nor will an ambiguous term of a
grant or contract be construed as a conveyance or surrender of sovereign
power.
238
Apparently drawing from Justice Powell's opinion in Bowen, Justice Souter
argued that application of the doctrine in any particular case "turns on whether
enforcement of the contractual obligation alleged would block the exercise of a
sovereign power of the Government."239 Further, Justice Souter reasoned that the
231. United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 708.
234. United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2440 (1996). Justice Breyer concurred in full and wrote
a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 2472. Justice O'Connor joined Justice Souter's opinion except as to Parts
IV-A and V-B. Id. at 2440.
235. Id. at 2476.
236. Id. at 2479. Justice Ginsburg joined as to Parts I, III, and IV of the dissent. Id.
237. Id. at 2455-56.
238. Id. at 2456.
239. Id. at 2457.
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doctrine is not rendered inapplicable merely because of the particular remedy
requested.24 "Since the criterion looks to the effect of a contract's enforcement,
... the doctrine is not rendered inapplicable by a request for damages, as distinct
from specific performance." '241 In other words, if the remedy is one that cannot
be provided without blocking the Government's sovereign power, such as a
demand for a tax rebate stemming from an implied tax exemption, then the doc-
trine of unmistakability allows the Government to avoid the underlying obliga-
tion.242 Although it does not directly block the tax, such a rebate is nothing more
than the return of the tax money in question, and the Government's exercise of its
taxing power is effectively blocked.243
Justice Souter further argued, however, that the doctrine does not apply to what
he termed contractual "risk-shifting" provisions:
So long as such a contract is reasonably construed to include a risk-shifting
component that may be enforced without effectively barring the exercise of that
[sovereign] power, the enforcement of the risk allocation raises nothing for the
unmistakability doctrine to guard against, and there is no reason to apply it.244
Justice Souter then held the contractual terms in the Winstar agreements to be
risk-shifting provisions to which the doctrine of unmistakability was inapplica-
ble.24 He reasoned that the respondents did not seek to enjoin the Government
from enforcing FIRREA, they merely sought monetary damages for losses that
arose from the regulatory change. "6 Furthermore, the award of such monetary
damages would not "deprive the Government of money it would otherwise be
entitled to receive (as a tax rebate would), since the capital requirements of FIR-
REA govern only the allocation of resources to a thrift and require no payments
to the Government at all. 247
Based upon his distinction in cases of risk-shifting provisions, Justice Souter
explained his holding in terms of blocking sovereign power: "[T]he Government
agreed to do something that did not implicate its sovereign powers at all, that is,
to indemnify its contracting partners against financial losses arising from regula-
tory change .... [T]he Federal Circuit correctly refused to apply the unmistaka-
bility doctrine here.
24s
Justice Scalia concurred in the result of Justice Souter's opinion, but his rea-
soning took a different path. He found no basis in prior case law for Justice
Souter's theory that the doctrine of unmistakability did not apply to "risk-shift-
ing" contractual provisions.24 9 In refuting Justice Souter's analysis, Justice Scalia
laid out a clear description of his understanding of unmistakability:
240. Id.
241. Id. (emphasis added).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2457-58.
245. Id.at2458.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2458-59.
248. Id. at 2461.
249. Id. at 2476.
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It is simply a rule of presumed (or implied-in-fact) intent. Generally, contract
law imposes upon a party to a contract liability for any impossibility of perfor-
mance that is attributable to that party's own actions. That is a reasonable esti-
mation of what the parties intend. When I promise to do x in exchange for your
doing y, I impliedly promise not to do anything that will disable me from doing
x, or disable you from doing y - so that if either of our performances is ren-
dered impossible by such an act on my part, I am not excused from my obliga-
tion. When the contracting party is the government, however, it is simply not
reasonable to presume an intent of that sort. To the contrary, it is reasonable to
presume (unless the opposite clearly appears) that the sovereign does not
promise that none of its multifarious sovereign acts, needful for the public good,
will incidentally disable it or the other party from performing one of the
promised acts. The requirement of unmistakability embodies this reversal of the
normal reasonable presumption. Governments do not ordinarily agree to curtail
their sovereign or legislative powers, and contracts must be interpreted in a com-
mon-sense way against that background understanding.25
With the doctrine of unmistakability thus reduced to a question of intent,
Justice Scalia held that the respondents in Winstar overcame the Government's
reverse presumption.251 He argued that there was an implied promise from the
Government not to alter the regulatory environment which allowed the particular
accounting treatment because it was extremely critical to the acquiring thrift's
continued survival.2 52 Otherwise, Justice Scalia argued, the Government made
only an illusory promise if it said in effect, "we promise to regulate in this fash-
ion for as long as we choose to regulate in this fashion."2 3
Justice Scalia thus interpreted the doctrine of unmistakability to be a canon
against any implied waiver of sovereign power over subsequent actions in areas
not contemplated by the parties-but if the implied waiver involved an aspect of
the bargain considered by the parties, the doctrine was overcome and the implied
provision would stand.25 " He then applied his interpretation to the facts of
Winstar: "In these circumstances, it is unmistakably clear that the promise to
accord favorable regulatory treatment must be understood as (unsurprisingly) a
promise to accord favorable regulatory treatment. 25 5
It should be noted that Justice Scalia's interpretation would overrule the doc-
trine's high-water mark in City of St. Louis, where that Court essentially held that
a promise to charge a fee of x must be accompanied by a separate promise not to
increase the amount of x. 25 6 Justice Scalia made this point clear when he stated
in Winstar, "I do not accept that unmistakability demands that there be a further
promise not to go back on the promise to accord favorable regulatory
treatment. ' 25 7 Although Justice Scalia was content to slightly weaken the impact
250. Id. at 2477.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing 1 R. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:2, p. 11 (4th ed. 1990)).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See City of St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266, 270, 272-74, 280 (1908).
257. United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2477 (1996).
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of the doctrine of unmistakability, the dissent in Winstar was not open to such a
flexible interpretation.
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his dissenting opinion with a restatement of the
doctrine's application in City of St. Louis.2 8 He was unwilling to back off from
the absolute position that "a waiver of sovereign authority will not be implied,
but instead must be surrendered in unmistakable terms."2 9 In refuting the plural-
ity's "newly minted distinction" in cases of risk-shifting provisions, the Chief
Justice argued that the plurality's interpretation would require a determination of
what damages would be awarded before there could be a determination of
whether the award of those damages would block some governmental power.26
He therefore found the plurality's position unacceptable.26'
For Chief Justice Rehnquist, the proper analysis for the doctrine of unmistaka-
bility was as follows: "Did the contract surrender the authority to enact or
amend regulatory measures as to the contracting party? If the sovereign did sur-
render its power unequivocally, and the sovereign breached that agreement to
surrender, then and only then would the issue of remedy for that breach arise." '262
Finding no such surrender of authority, the Chief Justice dissented from the
Court's holding for the respondents. Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently did not
agree with the majority of the Court who believed there are proper occasions for
limiting the power of the Government.
Following its discussion of the doctrine of unmistakability, the Supreme Court
turned its attention to another of the Government's defenses, the doctrine of sov-
ereign acts. Like unmistakability, the purpose of the sovereign acts doctrine is to
weaken restraints on legislative power in contravention to the contracts clause.
V THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN ACTS
A. The Origin of Sovereign Acts
Unlike the doctrine of unmistakability, the doctrine of sovereign acts did not
evolve from a long line of Supreme Court case law. In fact, the Supreme Court
has applied the doctrine of sovereign acts only once, and the Court did so in a
three page opinion in 1925.263 The case was Horowitz v. United States, and the
Court applied the doctrine of sovereign acts as rendered in several prior cases by
the Court of Claims.264
Horowitz involved the breach of a contract by the Ordnance Salvage Board for
the sale of surplus silk to the plaintiff.26 The sales contract specified the Salvage
Board would ship the silk to any destination within two days of being notified by
258. Id. at 2479.
259. Id. at 2480.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2481.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 2478. See Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925).
264. Horowitz, 267 U.S. at 461 (1925).
265. Id. at 459.
[VOL. 18:247
CONTRACTING WITH THE US. IN ITS ROLE AS REGULATOR
the plaintiff. 6' The plaintiff paid the purchase price, resold the silk to a third
party, and notified the Salvage Board to ship the silk to the third party.267 The
Salvage Board did not ship the silk, however, because the United States Railroad
Administration had placed an embargo on all silk shipments.266 Before the
Salvage Board was able to make the shipment, silk prices declined and the plain-
tiff suffered a loss.
269
In holding for the Salvage Board, the Supreme Court adopted the rule first
articulated by the Court of Claims: "[T]he United States when sued as a contrac-
tor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of the particular
contract resulting from its public and general acts as a sovereign. '27" The Court
went on to explain that the Government plays two roles when it enters into a con-
tract:
The two characters which the government possesses as a contractor and as a
sovereign cannot be thus fused; nor can the United States while sued in the one
character be made liable in damages for their acts done in the other. Whatever
acts the government may do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be
public and general, cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct or vio-
late the particular contracts into which it enters with private persons .... In this
court the United States appear simply as contractors; and they are to be held
liable only within the same limits that any other defendant would be in any other
court. Though their sovereign acts performed for the general good may work
injury to some private contractors, such parties gain nothing by having the
United States as their defendants.'
In other words, when the performance of the Government in its role as a con-
tractor is rendered impossible by an act of the Government in its role as a sover-
eign, the Government has a defense of impossibility of performance as would
any other ordinary contractor. The Government argued precisely this point when
it invoked the doctrine of sovereign acts in Winstar.272
B. The Application of Sovereign Acts in The Present Case
In writing the plurality opinion in Winstar, Justice Souter rejected the
Government's defense of the sovereign acts doctrine.272 He pointed out that the
relevant question concerning the doctrine's operation involved whether the per-
formance of the Government as a contractor had been blocked by a public act of
the Government as a sovereign .27  For Justice Souter, however, it was not enough
266. Id.
267. Id. at 459-60.
268. Id. at 460.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 461 (citing Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. CI. 190, 191 (1865); Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. CI.
383, 384 (1865); Wilson v. United States, 11 Ct. Cl. 513, 520 (1875)).
271. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. CI. 383 (1865)).
272. United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2463 (1996).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 2464.
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that the legislation in Winstar simply appeared to be aimed at some public
good.27 He argued that one of the Government's overriding goals in encouraging
the supervisory mergers was to protect the FSLIC's insurance fund.116 Since the
Government was acting out of self-interest to limit its own responsibility, "[t]he
inescapable conclusion . . . is that the Government's 'regulatory' and 'nonregula-
tory' capacities were fused." '277 Justice Souter continued, "[s]ome line has to be
drawn in situations like the one before us between regulatory legislation that is
relatively free of government self-interest and therefore cognizable for the pur-
pose of a legal impossibility defense and, on the other hand, statutes tainted by a
governmental object of self-relief."'278 Justice Souter argued that because the
Government acted with self-interest, it "should not have the benefit of the
defense." '279
After pointing out that the Government's act of self-interest nullified its claim
to be operating in two separate capacities, Justice Souter went on to argue anoth-
er reason why the doctrine of sovereign acts was eliminated as a defense.28 He
explained that the sovereign acts doctrine is based on the common law impossi-
bility defense, and it simply serves to relieve "the Government as contractor from
the traditional blanket rule that a contracting party may not obtain discharge if its
own act rendered performance impossible."28 ' Although the requirement that
one's own act not cause the impossibility is removed if the Government acts in a
separate capacity for the public good, all of the other elements of the impossibili-
ty defense remain in force.
28 2
The elements of an impossibility defense can be found in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, which states:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was
a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that per-
formance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.
283
Justice Souter argued that the doctrine of sovereign acts did not eliminate the
requirement that the event be one the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption of the parties.28 4 Therefore, the Government could not prevail unless
it was able to show that the non-occurrence of any regulatory changes was a
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Justice Souter held that the parties were fully aware that regulatory capital
requirements had been changed many times over the years, so the parties must
have certainly entered the contracts with possible future regulatory changes in
mind.186 He explained:
[G]iven the fact that a single modification of the applicable regulations could,
and ultimately did, eliminate virtually all of the consideration provided by the
Government in these transactions, it would be absurd to say that the nonoccur-
rence of a change in the regulatory capital rules was a basic assumption upon
which these contracts were made.287
Justice Souter's analysis thus lead to the conclusion that the doctrine of sover-
eign acts was not available to the Government as a defense; and even if it had
been, the other requirements of a common law impossibility defense were not
met.2 8
Justice Scalia quickly dismissed the doctrine of sovereign acts as an inapplica-
ble relic which should have fallen to the 1930s contracts cases of Lynch and
Perry which held that "the Government may not simply repudiate its contractual
obligations."'289
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist took the opposite view that the doctrine
of sovereign acts was not only alive, but that it applied in full force to Winstar.29°
He placed great weight on the fact that "FIRREA was a general regulatory enact-
ment. '291 Further, he was dissatisfied with the plurality's distinction for cases
where the Government's act is "tainted" by self-relief2 92 To refute the plurality,
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued:
In the normal sense of the word, any tax reform bill which tightens or closes tax
loopholes is directed to "government self-relief," since it is designed to put more
money into the public coffers. Be the act ever so general in its reform of the tax
laws, it apparently would not be a "sovereign act" allowing the Government to
defend against a claim by a taxpayer that he had received an interpretation from
the IRS that a particular type of income could continue to be treated in accor-
dance with existing statutes or regulations.292
Not satisfied with any of the arguments against the Government's defense, Chief
Justice Rehnquist urged the reversal of the court of appeals decision.294
286. Id. at 2470.
287. Id. at 2470-71.
288. Id. Justice Souter also argued that there could be no successful impossibility defense where the lan-
guage or the circumstances indicated an allocation of the risk to the party seeking discharge, and he found that
in the present case, the Bank Board and the FSLIC had indeed assumed the risk. Id. at 2471. Therefore, an
impossibility defense was unavailable to the Government because two necessary elements -other than the pro-
hibition against frustration by one's own act - had not been met. Id. at 2471-72.
289. Id. at 2478 (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330
(1935)).
290. Id. at 2485.
291. Id. at 2483.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2485.
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VI. ANALYSIS
The undisputed facts in Winstar are that certain financial institutions were
approached by the Government with proposals that those institutions take over
failed savings and loan associations.295 Further, there is no dispute that the
Government explicitly promised those acquiring institutions the use of certain
accounting methods in order to avoid their own insolvency, and that those
promises were embodied in valid contracts.29 What is disputed is whether the
Government may avoid liability for damages caused by subsequent regulatory
changes to the acquiring institutions' capital requirements which forced those
institutions into insolvency.
297
The Government contends that the doctrine of unmistakability requires any
surrender of its sovereign regulatory authority be made unmistakably, and not be
implied from the terms of the agreement. 29 To support its position, the
Government pointed to early Supreme Court cases which held that if the govern-
ment promises to do an act, it must also explicitly promise that it will not later
decide against doing that act.299 The Government also argues that it is shielded
by the doctrine of sovereign acts, which holds that when the performance of the
Government as a contractor is rendered impossible by an act of the Government
as a sovereign, the Government may use common law impossibility as a
defense."'
In exploring these two defenses, the Supreme Court found a way to justify
holding against the Government in Winstar. Rather than reforming the rule,
however, the plurality resorted to creating an exception which it applied in favor
of the respondents. This analysis will explore a more permanent option which
the Court did not consider. An argument will be made that the doctrines of
unmistakability and sovereign acts should be merged into one unified govern-
mental impossibility doctrine.
Of the Justices who wrote an opinion in Winstar, only Chief Justice Rehnquist
observed that the two doctrines-unmistakability and sovereign acts-are really
variations of the same principle, but he did not elaborate on his observation.0 1
The similarities between the two doctrines, however, can be found within the
remarks of the other Justices. Justice Souter described the unmistakability doc-
trine as operating to prevent opposing parties from "blocking" governmental
power by claiming that subsequent legislation does not apply to them.0 2 Justice
Scalia further explained that unmistakability actually operates as an impossibility
defense for the Government by creating a presumption that it made no promise
that one of its own subsequent acts would not render its performance
295. Id. at 2442.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 2447.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 2455.
300. Id. at 2463.
301. Id. at 2485.
302. Id. at 2457.
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impossible. 3 Likewise, Justice Souter explained that the sovereign acts doctrine
provides that if a subsequent Government act does render its own performance
impossible, then the restriction against "one's own act" is lifted in a common law
impossibility defense by the Government.
3 4
The two doctrines are therefore linked through the common law defense of
impossibility. Careful scrutiny of all three defenses in plain language reveals the
similarities. First, when one invokes impossibility, one is essentially saying, "I
cannot perform because something we assumed would not happen did happen;
but you cannot hold it against me because I did not make it happen." That some-
thing is generally some extraneous event outside those events contemplated by
the parties in their original bargain. Second, when the Government invokes the
sovereign acts doctrine, it is saying, "I cannot perform because something I did
prevents me from performing; and you cannot hold it against me even though it
was my own act that made my performance impossible." The sovereign acts doc-
trine thus allows one arm of the Government to pretend the act of another arm
was not its own for purposes of meeting the requirements of an impossibility
defense. Finally, when the Government invokes the unmistakability doctrine, it
is essentially saying, "I cannot perform because something I did prevents me
from performing; and you cannot hold it against me because I did not explicitly
promise I would not do something else that would prevent performance." The
doctrine of unmistakability thus allows the Government to pass subsequent legis-
lation which not only abrogates the agreement, but is also immediately binding
on the other party.
A close inspection of the three defenses reveals one element applicable to an
impossibility defense which does not appear to be (and should not be) inapplica-
ble to the other two defenses. Justice Souter placed great weight on it in his
argument,"5 and Justice Scalia came close to touching on it when he wrote that
unmistakability did not require a second promise not to go back on a first
promise. 6 The element is "the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption" of the contract. 7
This "assumption of a non-occurrence" is the crux of an argument for a unified
government contracts impossibility doctrine. If a common law impossibility
defense requires the intervening event to be something which the parties pre-
sumed would not happen, then the same should apply to the unmistakability and
sovereign acts doctrines because they are merely exceptions to the impossibility
defense. The intervening act of the Government must be something that the par-
ties did not contemplate in order for the Government to be shielded by any of the
three defenses. Anything that the parties did contemplate in their agreement,
such as being allowed certain regulatory treatment, could not be ignored without
the Government being liable for breach of contract.
303. Id. at 2477.
304. Id. at 2469.
305. Id. at 2457-58.
306. Id. at 2477.
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1979).
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Justice Scalia best explained the need for a unified governmental impossibility
doctrine when he argued that unmistakability is a rule of intent that creates a
reverse-presumption for the Government in situations where a subsequent
Government action has made its own performance impossible.0 8 Recall that he
stated:
When I promise to do x in exchange for your doing y, I impliedly promise not to
do anything that will disable me from doing x, or disable you from doing y - so
that if either of our performances is rendered impossible by such an act on my
part, I am not excused from my obligation. When the contracting party is the
government, however, it is simply not reasonable to presume an intent of that
sort. To the contrary, it is reasonable to presume (unless the opposite clearly
appears) that the sovereign does not promise that none of its multifarious sover-
eign acts, needful for the public good, will incidentally disable it or the other
party from performing one of the promised acts." 9
Justice Scalia's analysis provides an excellent foundation for understanding the
doctrine's relationship to an impossibility defense, but he does not carry his
example far enough. By adding a "presumption of non-occurrence" to his analy-
sis, a workable model for a unified doctrine can be achieved. Rather than phras-
ing the doctrine in terms of a "non-occurrence," however, it is more easily under-
stood if phrased in terms of an uncontemplated act as follows: If the
Government promises to do x in exchange for your doing y, then the Government
does not impliedly promise that some separate, uncontemplated Government act
z will not prevent the performance of either x or y-but under no circumstances
will the Government be allowed to simply avoid the performance of x unless the
subsequent, uncontemplated act z so prevents it.
A few clarifications to this unified doctrine will make the picture complete.
First, this doctrine protects the Government from liability for implied promises
only. The Government bears the risk if it expressly promises that no future act z
will prevent the performance of x. Second, the Government is barred from mak-
ing illusory promises. There cannot be a promise to do x only until the
Government decides to no longer do x. The Government can escape its duty only
if some other unrelated act z prevents it from performing x. Third, nothing in this
doctrine prevents the Government from exercising its sovereign power to enact
legislation z. The dispute centers on its potential liability for failing to perform
its initial promise x, so the sovereign power remains completely unfettered.
What effect would such a unified doctrine have had on Winstar? It would have
held the Government liable for barring the accounting methods allowed in the
merger agreements. Essentially, the Government promised to allow accounting
method x, then it later passed legislation which disallowed accounting method x.
The Government changed its mind, and would be held liable. Had the
Government enacted legislation z, however, which prevented the performance of
308. United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2477 (1996).
309. Id.
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x, the Government would not have been liable. For example, if the Government
agreed to allow accounting method x, but later passed legislation z which made
all savings and loans associations illegal, then the doctrine of unmistakability
would hold the Government not liable for its inability to allow accounting
method x.
A unified doctrine would provide a clearer rule for future parties contracting
with the Government. Also, such a doctrine would square with all prior cases
herein discussed, with the exception of City of St. Louis.1 Thinking in terms of
the Government escaping liability only if promise x is blocked by an uncontem-
plated act z illustrates how a unified doctrine would hold in prior cases. In the
bank charter cases, the subsequent passage of a tax was not in the direct contem-
plation of the parties when the Government promised to allow the operation of a
bank, so the Government could have invoked the defense."' In Lynch, since the
dispute involved the repeal of the Government's original promise to provide
insurance, no subsequent uncontemplated act was present, so the Government
was rightfully held liable. 12 In Merrion, the imposition of a tax was unrelated to
the original promise granting mineral rights.3 In Bowen, the Court held that no
vested rights were involved, but the unified doctrine would still support a finding
for the Government because a contract must be present. 14 Finally, in Cherokee
Nation, the Government's exercise of its right to provide navigational improve-
ments was not directly contemplated when the original grant of ownership was
made to the tribe. 5
The one case that would not square with a unified doctrine would be City of St.
Louis." 6 There, the city promised to allow street railways to operate for a certain
fee. Later, the city amended the original ordinance to increase the fee, although
it had already been paid by the plaintiffs. Clearly, there was no subsequent
uncontemplated act. The city altered the terms of the original act contemplated
by the parties. The plaintiffs would have prevailed under the proposed unified
doctrine.
In sum, the doctrines of unmistakability and sovereign acts serve a vital pur-
pose in expanding the availability of an impossibility defense for the
Government. Because the two doctrines serve the same purpose and stem from
the same defense, however, they should be merged into one rule for easy applica-
tion by parties contracting with the Government. Such a unified rule would
avoid the confusion of multiple rules, each with multiple exceptions.
310. City of St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266 (1908).
311. Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1853); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4
Pet.) 514 (1830).
312. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
313. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
314. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
315. United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
316. City of St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266 (1908).
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VII. CONCLUSION
An impossibility defense serves to allow individuals to limit their liability
when forces beyond their control render their performance impossible. The
intervening event, however, must be one the non-occurrence of which was
assumed, and it cannot be due to an act by the party seeking to avoid liability. As
with individuals, the Government is also capable of making promises which
become impossible to perform. Unlike individuals, however, the Government
must be afforded a much broader defense. Modern government operates through
widespread agencies of various branches, each possessing regulatory authority.
If the Government were disallowed an impossibility defense because one of its
numerous sovereign acts rendered its own performance impossible, the result
would be a fatal restraint on any exercise of sovereign power.
The doctrines of unmistakability and sovereign acts evolved to broaden the
Government's defense of impossibility by removing the restriction against acts by
the party seeking to avoid liability. Without the restriction, if one arm of the
Government is unable to perform due to some other sovereign act of the
Government, impossibility remains a valid defense. The danger arises, however,
when the sovereign act originates from the arm of the Government making the
promise. Completely unrestricted, the doctrines of unmistakability and sovereign
acts allow the Government to make purely illusory promises.
The solution is to make sure the other elements of an impossibility defense
remain effective (such as the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption of the contract). By retaining that requirement in any
governmental impossibility defense, the Government would be prevented from
making illusory promises. At the same time, however, it would remain free to
exercise its sovereign power without the risk that any one act would cause it
untold liability in some unforeseen way. A unified governmental impossibility
doctrine would serve such a purpose.
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